We propose a general formal structure for symmetric information delegation games that encompasses many existing economic applications in the elds of oligopoly theory, the theory of the rm, strategic trade policy and international political economy. W e prove that all individually rational allocations are implementable in delegation games with non separable utility. Secondly, w e show that contract renegotiation and non observable contracts have similar e ects only in particular cases. We prove that all the equilibria obtained when renegotiation is excluded are implementable as renegotiation proof equilibria, provided that the side transfer technology implies a dead-weight loss increasing in the size of the transfer.
Introduction
Delegation games represent a strategic situation in which many agencies interact non cooperatively. In this paper we consider two stage delegation games in which the principals choose a compensation scheme for their agents, while these latter play a game on behalf of the principals. The payo s of all players are determined by the actions chosen by the agents. The principals can in uence the outcome of the game indirectly, b y shaping their own agent's reaction function through the design of an incentive s c heme, which becomes public information once chosen 1 .
This framework has been applied to a variety of economic problems, a probably incomplete list of which includes managerial contracts and vertical relations in oligopoly, strategic trade policy and international political economy 2 . The rst topic was rst explored, largely at a qualitative level, by Vickers' 1985 seminal paper, and further developed by F ershtman and Judd 1987, Sklivas 1987 , Polo and Tedeschi 1992 and Katz 1991 . The e ects of strategic delegation on the internal architecture of rms is analized in Koray and Sertel 1989 for what concerns hierarchical relations and in Polo and Tedeschi 1990 with reference to the rm divisional structure. Vertical contractual relations are studied in K uhn 1990. Delegation games proved to be very useful for the analysis of policy design issues. For instance, the theory of strategic trade policy was originated by t wo seminal contributions by Spencer 1983, 1985 and developed by a series of paper, examples of which are Eaton and Grossman 1986 , Laussel 1992 and Maggi 1991 . Finally, an example of international political economy models is Persson and Tabellini 1992 . It is worth noting that this literature has been developed almost completely through examples, with very few general results. Exceptions are Fershtman, Judd and Kalai 1991, Katz 1991 and Caillaud et al. 1993 . The rst proves a Folk Theorem in delegation games with separable utility. Katz shows that most of the strategic e ect of delegation is lost if contracts are unobservable. Caillaud et al. prove that with asymmetric information delegation has strategic e ects, even if secret renegotiation is allowed. However, to obtain this result, it is necessary to make speci c assumptions about strategic complementarity and on the direct e ect of the opponents' action on the principals' welfare. The results in Caillaud et al. 1993 were anticipated by examples examined in Katz 1991 and Judd 1986. Our rst aim is to prove the existence and to characterize the set of equilibria in a uni ed formal structure, which can encompass most of the quoted 2-agency models with symmetric information 3 . In this framework we prove a F olk Theorem for delegation games. The result is more general than the one obtained in Fershtman, Judd and Kalai 1991, since we allow for non separable utilities. Moreover, the set of equilibrium allocations includes all the individually rational allocations and not only the Pareto e cient ones, as in that paper. The proof of the Folk Theorem uses a preliminary result, that we de ne Stackelberg Property, which shows that the incentive compatibility constraint o f the agent is not binding for his own principal 4 . Hence, in a subgame perfect equilibrium, each principal chooses a contract which induces the most preferred allocation on the reaction function of the rival agent, once taken into account the participation contraint o f her own agent, i.e. each principal acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to all agents.
The Stackelberg Property allows us to show w h y the high multiplicity of equilibria implied by the Folk Theorem is endemic in these models. The explanation is intuitively as follows. Suppose that the equilibrium is an internal maximum for both agencies and that the maximizing action of both agents is unique in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. The equilibrium imposes only local restrictions on the compensation schemes, i.e. the indi erence curve o f e a c h principal must be tangent to the best reply function of the other agent 5 . If the principals have enough degrees of freedom in shaping the reaction function of their own agent, almost any allocation can be sustained as an equilibrium of the delegation game. While in some applications there exists a unique equilibrium, e.g. judd 1987 and Sklivas 1987 , this result is obtained by imposing strong restrictions on the set of feasible contracts. Polo and Tedeschi 1991 prove i n the same setting the existence of a high multiplicity of equilibria if the set of feasible contracts is su ciently enlarged.
The second aim of this paper relates to renegotiation and observability of contracts. It is often argued that the relevance of delegation games is questionable, since their main results hold only under very restrictive assumptions, i.e. that agents' contracts are public information and not renegotiable. When one of these assumptions is removed, it can be proved that the wide multiplicity of equilibria disappears, often remaining with the set of equilibria of the game without delegation. To illustrate this point, suppose that the payo s of the agents depend only upon their own compensation scheme, which is public information. In that case each player can compute the best reply functions and the Nash equilibrium of the agents' game. Suppose now that principal i can secretly renegotiate the compensation to agent i. Since the other agent cannot observe principal i's deviation, he cannot react. This implies that principal i will compute the payo of her deviation from the proposed strategy pro le holding the other agent's action, and not his best reply function, constant. Hence, when designing the optimal secret side contract each principal solves a problem that is very similar to the one in which the contract is private information. Katz 1991 argues that the non-observability of contracts and the possibility of secret renegotiation produce the same e ects in delegation games, since in both cases the strategic dimension of delegation is almost completely lost, at least under symmetric information. With asymmetric information the same work by Katz 1991 and especially that of Caillaud et al. 1993 prove that delegation preserves a strategic e ect under speci c assumption, but a Folk Theorem cannot be proved.
Contrary to Katz's 1991 argument, and maintaining the assumption of symmetric information, we prove that renegotiation proof equilibria can induce a set of outcomes identical to that of the games where renegotiation is excluded. The crucial condition is that the side transfer technology implies a dead-weight loss increasing in the size of the side compensation. This assumption has been used with di erent motivations both in the theory of interest groups -Stigler 1971 -and in that of collusion in organizations -Tirole 1992, p. 152. In our case, by designing the main contract with a kink at the equilibrium allocation, the principals are able to make ex post renegotiation too costly 5 Of course, also the second order conditions must be satis ed, which a n yhow translate into weak restrictions on the compensation schemes. Moreover, the notion of indi erence curves must be quali ed, since in constructing them we need to take care of the participation constraint of the agent. Hence, the indi erence curves imply the same payo for the principal while maintaining the agent at the reservation utility.
for themselves. This result holds for increasing, but arbitrarily small, extra-costs of the side contract.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we set up the model. In the third section we prove a F olk Theorem for delegation games. Section 4 modi es the model in order to take i n to account the issue of renegotiation proofness. In section 5 we derive the main propositions regarding renegotiation proof equilibria. Concluding remarks follow.
2-Agencies Delegation Games
In this section we set up the main features of a 2-agency delegation game, stating and discussing the relevant assumptions. Informally, this class of games describes the strategic interaction between two agencies, each composed by one principal and one agent. The principals do not participate directly in the game, which is played on their behalf by the agents. However, the former can in uence the outcome of the game by shaping the payo of the latter. We rst introduce most of the assumptions and then discuss them brie y. In Assumption 1 we consider simple agencies with only one principal and one agent. Assumption 2 implies that each agent's action space is an interval on the real line. The utility of each principal and agent Assumptions 3 and 4 depends upon the actions taken by the agents; m i is a transfer payment from p i to a i . Note that we do not assume separable utility in income and actions, neither in the principals', not in the agents' utility function as it is usually done in this literature. Moreover, to obtain a non trivial solution of the game, we impose further restrictions on the utility functions, concerning the individual rationality constraints for principals and agents Assumption 5. The individual rationality constraint for the principal implies that the utility m ust be at least equal to the largest value between the outside option and the min-max. In fact, the principal can never be forced to go below these two levels of utility. Finally, w e consider a two stage game, characterized by the following timing. In the next section we analyse the equilibria in delegation games.
A F olk Theorem for Delegation Games
In the previous section we h a ve de ned a two-stage game of symmetric information, whose appropriate equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. Consequently, the equilibrium analysis requires to work backward, beginning from the last stage game played by the agents. The proof is by contradiction. Notice thatŝ 2 S 0 , because the participation constraint m ust hold for all i. Moreover, since we maximize principals' utility, the individual rationality constraint of both agents will bind. Furthermore, in S 0 principals' individual rationality constraint is certainly satis ed. Suppose thatŝ andm are the solution of problem S for all i, but and^ are not a SPE. Since S must hold for all i, it is easy to check that^ is a Nash equilibrium in the agents' game. Therefore, if and^ are not a SPE there must exist for at least one principal a pro The slope of agent's best reply function is -1 2 and the principal is able only to shift its intercept through the parameter i . Since the slope of the isopro t curve i s a , c , 2bq i , bq j =bq i , the tangency condition is met only at one point, which i s q i = q j = 2 a , c=5b. the principal is now able to choose the intercept and the slope of her agent's reaction function, and the tangency condition can be met at any individually rational allocation.
The above analysis can be used to prove a F olk Theorem for SPE in delegation games. o f 3 i s a n umber at the proposed allocation, from principal j's program we obtain a restriction on the slope of agent i's best reply @~ i =@s j . T otally di erentiating 6 we obtain: 7 This is not restrictive since, given our assumptions on the utility function of agents and principals, the tangency condition we are using can be implemented even at the boundary of S0 for right or left derivatives. Hence by focussing on internal maxima we are able to map all the relevant allocations. of contracts with polynomial form can always meet all the restrictions on the partial derivatives and on the intercept induced by the rst and second order conditions of the agents' and principals' problems, which w ere just described. So we know that the initial allocation ŝ;m is a local maximum for the agents, while s is a local maximum for the principals. We can always nd a polynomial function which satis es the second order conditions globally in S .  2 Theorem 2 states that, in general, any equilibrium ourcomeŝ consistent with the individual rationality constraints can be implemented as a SPE in a delegation game. This result resembles, in a static setting, the well known Folk Theorem in repeated games. The multiplicity of equilibria is endemic in delegation games and derives from two di erent features of the model; rst of all, the equilibrium conditions set only local restrictions on the compensation schemes of the agents at a speci c equilibrium point, and are consistent with many di erent contracts associated to the same equilibrium outcomê s. Secondly, the principals are able to implement many di erent equilibrium outcomes by selecting the appropriate compensation schemes. We h a ve therefore a multiplicity o f equilibria in both the contract and the action spaces 8 .
@~

Renegotiation
It has been argued -Katz 1991 -that admitting the possibility of renegotiating the contracts has the same e ects on delegation games as the assumption of non observ- 8 Our result, as well as the nature of the multiplicity of equilibria and the crucial conditions for an equilibrium, share some features of the literature on competition in supply functions -Klemperer and Meyer 1989. In that setting, rms compete in the market by committing to a supply schedule, while in equilibrium each rm maximizes pro ts given its residual demand, which is determined by the rival's supply function. The main di erence between the supply function approach and our own is that in our model each principal must take i n to account her agent's preferences and participation constraint in order to implement an action through an incentive s c heme. The participation constraint implies that the set of equilibrium allocations might be smaller in a delegation game than in a supply function model, while agent's preferences impose stronger restrictions on the set of contracts which can implement a particular allocation in delegation as compared to supply function models. In many applications, e.g. managerial contracts and retailer-producers relations, agents' utility does not depend directly upon actions and their outside option is the same as that of the principals. In these cases we expect a one-to-one relation between delegation and supply function equilibria. For similar results in an asymmetric information model see K uhn 1990. able contracts, that is it reduces the strategic e ect of delegation. With asymmetric information Katz 1991 and Caillaud et al. 1993 prove that delegation can still have strategic e ects under speci c assumptions, even if secret renegotiation is admitted, but the Folk Theorem result does not hold anymore. In this section we shall show that the consequences of renegotiation are not necessarily the same as those of non observable contracts, even with symmetric information. More precisely, renegotiation reduces the possibilities for the strategic use of delegation only when the side and the main contracts are perfect substitutes for the principals. If, on the contrary, there is a slightly higher marginal cost in compensating the agent through a side contract, then delegation induces the large multiplicity of equilibria described in section 3 9 . If, instead, renegotiation implies a lump sum dead-weight loss, delegation still enlarges the set of equilibrium allocations, but in general a Folk Theorem does not hold.
The formal assumptions of the model are as follows. All the assumptions from 1 to 5 are almost the same as in section 2. That amounts to saying that we h a ve t wo agencies each composed by one principal and one agent. The agents' sets of actions are interval in , as in the previous sections. The agents' utility functions have the same properties and players face the same individual rationality constraints as in section 2. The only modi cation refers to the utility function of the principals. The main di erence with respect to Assumption 3 is that 3r speci es di erent marginal costs to the principal for the main and the side contracts. In particular there is a cost in deviating from the main contract represented by the assumption about the derivatives of u i p with repect to the main and the side compensations 10 . T ransferring one unit of money to the agent through the side contract costs more to the principal in utility terms than through the main contract. There are various justi cations of this assumption, broadly related to the cost of keeping secret the contract. Higher costs can depend upon internal organization reasons, upon capital market imperfections that make nancing the side transfer more costly, or can derive from the use of non monetary transfers. In a word, these renegotiation costs are additional transaction costs 11 .
Finally, the utility function of the agent has the form u i a s; m i m + m i s . Therefore, side and main contracts are perfect substitutes for the agent. Assumption 6r adapts the timing of the game to the present three stage case.
Assumption 6r Timing of the game. The utility functions of all principals and all agents are common knowledge from the beginning. The crucial di erence between the main and the side contract is that while the former becomes public information, the latter is privately observed by a i and p i . The e ects of assuming @u i p =@m i s @ u i p =@m i m might b e n o w better understood. If the two derivatives were equal, there would not be any di erence between the main and the side contracts, that is, the principals would be able to counterbalance the main contract with the side payment, obtaining in t 2 any desired net payment to the agent with no additional cost. This is no longer the case if the side transfer is more costly to the principal than the main contract.
In the present set up we h a ve also to modify the assumptions referring to players' strategies.
Assumption 7r Principals' strategy. p i in t 1 reason why w e are assuming transaction costs increasing in the deviation is twofold. On the one hand, the case of increasing transaction costs allows us to reach more precise and better characterized results with respect to the lump sum case. Hence, we deal with the former more extensively. On the other hand, on a theoretical ground, it is not clear to us why the lump sum case should be more relevant than the alternative one, as a representation of the costs of keeping secret the side contract. While a precise assessment of which is the correct assumption can be done only empirically and case by case, it is here convenient to analyze more in details the assumption which allows us to derive stringer results.
Assumption 8r Agents' strategy. A strategy for agent a i is the choice of a function i : M m M s ! S i . i is the strategy set of agent a i and the set of all agents' strategy pro les is = 1 2 , with generic element .
Given Assumptions 1, 2, 3r, 4, 5, 6r, 7r, and 8r, a three stage delegation game with renegotiation is , d r = n fP;Ag; fM m ; M s ; gfu i p ; u i a g i=1;2 ; fu p ; u a g o 5 Existence of a Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium Subgame perfection remains the appropriate equilibrium concept also in this modi ed setting, given the time and information structure described in Assumption 6r. The de nition of subgame perfection in this new set up is easily derived from that of section 3. Before stating the main results, it is necessary fo de ne a Renegotiation proof equilibrium RPE. An equilibtium f m ; s ;^ g is said to be renegotiation proof if it is subgame perfect and if s m s; s = 0 ; 8s 2 S. The de nition of renegotiation proofness in the present context is quite obvious: the contract must satisfy the proposed equilibrium concept and no principal proposes and or no agent accepts a side contract. Since by assumption we m ust be at an equilibrium in the agents' game with di erentiable contracts, the following holds: @s i does not appear in 9. This is formally the main implication of the assumption of non observable side contracts. Furthermore, in the models in which agents' utility does not depend upon the actions but only on the payment, as usually assumed in the managerial contracts literature, at an agents' equilibrium @u i a =@s i = 0 and 13 implies @u i p =@s i = 0, which correspond to the rst order conditions of a game in which the principals play directly the game. In this case, with di erentiable main contracts, the game with unobservable side contracts and that without delegation have the same subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
Theorem 3 implies that a necessary condition for an outcome not belonging toŜ r to be sustained as RPE is that the main contract of each agency i m s has a kink at the equilibrium outcome. The next theorem shows that the entire set of individually rational outcomes can be sustained as a RPE by such contracts.
Theorem 4 All the individually rational allocations S 0 can be implemented a s R P E outcomes in , d r . I f s 6 2Ŝ r the set of RPE de ned i n T h e orem 3 the main contracts of all agencies, m s, must be non di erentiable atŝ.
Proof: The proof will be constructive. Suppose that the strategy pro le ^ ; with outcome ŝ;m is a SPE with di erentiable contracts in the delegation game without renegotiation , d with the same players and utility functions as in , d r . W e know from The proof of the Theorem o ers a clear insight o n h o w a RPE works. We h a ve seen that in general the principal has a rst order incentive to secretly induce a deviation, if she uses a di erentiable main contract. In fact, in a secret renegotiation the principal has to maintain the agent at his reservation utility u a , b y compensating the agent through the side transfer m i s . But with a smooth main contract, atŝ, the agent has only second order e ects in deviating fromŝ i , and therefore he requires only second order modi cations of the side transfer in order to remain indi erent. Hence, if the main contract is smooth atŝ, the principal can pro tably deviate. By designing the main contract kinked at the proposed allocation, we can induce rst order e ects of the desired magnitude if the agent deviates. The relative ine ciency of using the side contract enables to make it unpro table to o er the side contract to induce a deviation 12 . In summary a renegotiation proof main contract must counterbalance the principal's incentive to deviate by making very costly to the agent to comply to the principal's desire. According to such a contract, the agent requires a high compensation in order to deviate; since this latter must be payed ine ciently through the side transfer, inducing the deviation becomes unpro table for the principal. The two ingredients that allow to obtain this result are a kink in the main contract i m at the desired actionŝ i and a higher marginal cost of the side contract for the principal.
If renegotiation implies a lump sum dead-weight loss, when o ering a side contract the principal compares her rst order increase in utility to the lump sum cost and the extra payment due to her agent. This payment has only second order e ects on principal's utility, since there is always a smooth contract which implements the desired action. It is intuitive that renegotiation will occur if the lump sum dead-weight loss is lower than the increase in utility the principal can obtain by inducing the agent's deviation. Large lump sum losses will prevent most of the possible deviations, thus making a large set of allocations to be renegotiation proof equilibrium outcomes. However, small lump sum costs would be insu cient to prevent renegotiation in a large set of allocations. In all cases, it will be true that the set of implementable allocations has a positive measure, event though the Folk Theorem cannot hold anymore, unless in the special case of very large transaction costs. A precise characterization of the set of renegotiation proof equilibria cannot be obtained in this case without further restrictions on players' preferences. 6 Concluding remarks Delegation games are de ned by a formal structure which enables to analyze a variety o f economic and policy design problems, such as managerial contracts in oligopoly, v ertical relations among retailers and producers, strategic trade policies, the selection of political representatives in international institutions, ets. We observe an increasing use of this framework in the literature, that has been developed mainly through examples and applications. Only a limited number of papers, instead, deal with general de nitions and results.
In this paper we proved the existence and characterized the set of equilibria in delegation games in a uni ed formal structure, which can encompass most of the applications in the literature. In this framework we prove a F olk Theorem which is more general than that obtained by F ershtman, Judd and Kalai 1991 since we allow for non separable utilities. Moreover, the set of equilibrium outcomes includes all the individually rational allocations and not only the Pareto e cien ones, as in the quoted paper. In proving the Folk Theorem we derive a useful feature of equilibria in delegation games, which w e de ne the Stackelberg Property. This property states that in a subgame perfect equilibrium each principal chooses a contract that induces the most preferred allocation on the reaction function of the rival agent, once taken into accounto the participation contraint of her own agent. Therefore, each principal acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to all agents. In the text we argued why this property can explain the high multiplicity o f equilibria, which is endemic in delegation games. Moreover, the Stackelberg Property allows to nd a simple algorithm to construct equilibria in speci c examples.
The second part of the paper deals with the renegotiation problem. It is often argued that contract renegotiation, as contract non observability, reduces the possibilities of a strategic use of delegation. The existing literature found that strategic e ects of delegation persist only with asymmetric information, even when renegotiation is allowed. Howeve r , a F olk Theorem was not proved as yet. In a symmetric information setting we studied secret renegotiation assuming that the side contract implies a dead-weight loss. When this additional cost of renegotiation is increasing in the size of the side payment, we proved that a Folk Theorem still holds, provided that the main contracts are kinked at the desired allocation. If the dead-weight loss is lump sum, a strategic e ect of delegation still exists, but the set of renegotiation proof allocations is smaller.
